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K & D Holdings, LLC v. Equitrans, L.P., 2015 WL 
9461340, No. 15-1166 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 
Lessor brought suit against both Lessee and Operator 
alleging that Operator had not followed through with 
the terms of the lease by failing to explore, produce, 
and store gas. Lessor argued that due to Operator’s lack 
of action in all unit areas, Lessor was entitled to a 
“rebuttable presumption” under state law, which 
provides that an operator has abandoned the lease if the 
operator is inactive on the premises. Producer counter 
argued that the “rebuttable presumption” statute at issue 
did not apply because, under the terms of the lease, 
Operator had to perform only one of the alternative acts 
within the lease in order to maintain the entire lease. 
Operator contended that the lease should continue 
because Operator was protecting the underground gas 
on the premises by storing it. The district court rejected 
both arguments and acted, sua sponte, by finding that 
the lease in question was divisible into separate tracts, 
one tract continuing for exploration and production, 
with a separate tract remaining for gas storage. The 
lower court additionally held that after segmenting the 
lease into two separate tracts, the exploration and 
production tract had terminated after the primary term. 
The Operator appealed the lower court’s decision. The 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Operator, and found that 
under a fair construction of the lease terms, the lease 
was not divisible. Thus, because the Operator was using 
a portion of the land under the lease for protection of 
gas storage, the Operator maintained all of the rights 




Kentucky Coal Ass’n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 804 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 
Coal Association brought this action against Valley 
Authority (Authority), pursuing a declaratory judgment 
that Authority arbitrarily switched a power plant from 
coal to natural-gas generation, thereby failing to comply 
with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (TVAA) and 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in 
favor of Authority, giving deference to Authority’s 
discernable decision-making process. The 
administrative record established that Authority 
considered two alternatives to comply with the Clean 
Air Act: (1) switching from coal to natural gas and 
(2) retrofitting old units with new pollution controls. 
Authority achieved the goal of the TVAA, which is 
to provide the least-cost energy system by 
considering relevant data over a twenty-year 
consumption period. The Court noted that although 
retrofitting would cost less in the short-term, the 
financial effect over the next two decades led 
Authority to switch to natural gas. Authority fulfilled 
NEPA standards by completing the preliminary 
environmental assessment, concluding that the switch 
would have no significant impact on the 
environment. The Court deferred to Authority’s 





Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 808 F.3d 373 (8th 
Cir. 2015). 
 
Operator filed suit against Lessor seeking a 
declaratory judgment on whether an oil and gas lease 
executed between the parties was still in effect after 
the expiration of the primary term. At the end of the 
primary term, production existed in all parts of a 
section except the Southwest quarter. Lessor 
conceded that the lease was still in effect in the other 
three quarter-sections but argued that the lease 
expired as to the nonproducing Southwest quarter. 
Conversely, Operator argued that the Pugh Clause 
found within the terms of the lease caused the lease 
to remain valid as to the entire section. The district 
court focused its analysis on the definition of the 
word “section” found within the lease’s Pugh Clause 
and granted summary judgment in favor of Operator. 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, holding that the Pugh Clause severed the 
lease by the section boundaries. The Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the appropriate definition of the word 
“section” refers to the one-mile tract of land, such 
that production found on any part of that one-mile 






McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp.  
 




Mineral Sellers (Sellers) filed suit against the Oil 
Company (Company) that purchased their mineral 
rights, alleging fraud and seeking a rescission of the 
transaction. Sellers claimed that Company intentionally 
targeted vulnerable and elderly mineral rights owners 
who were not experienced in oil and gas practices. 
Company did not reveal to the mineral rights holders 
that it had an innovative carbon dioxide based 
technology that greatly enhanced the amount of oil that 
could be extracted, although it did release the 
technological advancement via press release. The new 
technology coupled with poor market conditions 
resulted in Company being able to purchase more 
mineral rights at lower prices. Sellers allege fraud by 
silence in failing to reveal the new technology to 
Sellers. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held for 
Company and refused to nullify the transaction, citing 




Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Southern 
Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., 2015 WL 6550654, No. 
93A02-1502-EX-110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
 
Utility Company filed a petition with the state’s Utility 
Regulatory Commission (Commission) for approval to 
modify their coal powered generating stations to meet 
new EPA standards, requesting incentives and 
reimbursement from ratepayers for costs associated 
with the proposed modification. Action Coalition and 
others intervened, opposing the petition and arguing 
that retiring Utility Company’s coal powered generators 
and replacing them with new natural gas-powered 
generators would be more cost-effective. The 
Commission approved the proposal and granted the 
request for reimbursement. On appeal, Action Coalition 
argued that the Commission failed to make necessary 
findings of fact material to its determination of the 
issues and statutory factors. Utility Company 
responded, claiming that the appeal was moot and that 
the Commission made all necessary findings. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals held that the Commission did 
err in failing to make findings on the factors listed in 





Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC, 
2015 WL 5964939, No. 04–14–00903–CV (Tex. App. 
2015). 
 
Oil company (Lessee) leased mineral acreage from a 
landowner (Lessor). Lessee brought suit claiming 
trespass against another Drilling Company and 
sought to enjoin Drilling Company from drilling 
through the Lessee’s leasehold estate to reach a 
neighboring lease. While Drilling Company had 
permission to drill from the Lessor, it did not have 
permission from Lessee to cross its leasehold estate. 
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the lower 
court’s decision granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Drilling Company. The Court of Appeals 
determined control of the subsurface belonged to the 
surface owner, as Lessee did not own or exclusively 
control the subsurface. Although Lessee developed, 
operated, and produced oil in the subsurface, Lessee 
was not conveyed the ability to control the subsurface 
to the extent of ejecting other drilling companies 




Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 363 P.3d 18 
(Wyo. 2015). 
 
Energy Company (Company) obtained oil and gas 
leases in Wyoming and subsequently entered into 
contracts with the owners of the surface estate 
(Landowners), which granted Company access to and 
use of Landowners’ property to explore and extract 
minerals. In the surface agreements, Company 
committed to pay for surface damages and use of the 
land, and to restore the land as close to its prior 
condition as possible once drilling operations 
concluded. Landowners sued for breach of the 
surface agreements. The lower court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Landowners, 
concluding that Company remained liable under the 
surface agreements even after assignment of the 
mineral estate. The Supreme Court of Wyoming 
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the 
agreements between Company and Landowners did 
not release Company from its obligations upon 
assignment, the exculpatory clause in the lease was 
not incorporated by reference into the surface 
agreements, and Landowners were entitled to an 
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Arizona Dept. of Water Resources v. McClennen, 238 
Ariz. 371 (Ariz. 2015). 
 
Corporation applied to the Arizona Department of 
Water Resources (ADWR), seeking to transfer its rights 
to use surface water pursuant to a state statute. County, 
believing that it was an “interested person” under the 
state statute, sought to prevent this transfer. Despite 
County’s objections, ADWR granted Corporation’s 
transfer application. County appealed the decision to 
the Superior Court. The Superior Court vacated 
ADWR’s decision. Corporation then appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Arizona. The Supreme Court of 
Arizona vacated the Superior Court’s decision and held 
that County was not an interested person because under 
the state statute, an interested person is one who alleges 
that they have an interest that is protected by the statute 
that would be affected by the application for severance 
and transfer. Based on the evidence before the Court, 





Great Oaks Water Company v. Santa Clara Valley 
Water District, 242 Cal.App.4th 1187 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 
Water District levied extraction fees on Water 
Company for water drawn from wells on its property. 
Water Company brought suit, claiming that the 
extraction fees violated the Santa Clara Valley Water 
District Act (SCVWDA). The lower court found in 
favor of Water Company and awarded it a complete 
refund of the extraction fees and, in the alternative, a 
partial refund on grounds that the fees charged violated 
the SCVWDA. The Appellate Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision and held: (1) the fee is a property-
related charge for purposes of Article 13D, and thus, it 
is subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; 
(2) the fee is also a charge for water service, which is 
exempt from the voter ratification requirement; (3) the 
pre-suit claim submitted by Water Company did not 
preserve any monetary damages against Water District 
for the violations of Article 13D; and (4) because the 
matter was treated as a simple action for damages when 
it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of 
mandate, the lower court failed to apply a deferential 
standard of review in deciding whether Water District’s 
setting of the fee—or its use of the resulting 




In Matter of Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392 (Colo. 
2015). 
 
Applicant filed an application to appropriate storm 
runoff water. The application was denied by the 
Ground Water Commission (Commission) due to the 
fact that the water did not flow adjacent to a 
continuous natural stream. The Commission 
determined that the runoff was ground water and 
therefore under its exclusive jurisdiction. Applicant 
proceeded to file for a hearing on his application. The 
lower court denied his application, finding that a 
portion of the storm runoff was designated ground 
water, which falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision because the water Applicant sought 
to appropriate met the statutory definition of 
designated ground water and was therefore subject to 
the administration of the Commission. On appeal, the 





Champlain Wind, LLC v. Board of Environmental 
Protection, 2015 WL 7770652, No. 14-291 (Me. 
2015). 
 
Wind Developer submitted a proposal for a windfarm 
within what is defined by state law as an “expedited 
area.” According to the statutory language, the 
process is streamlined for permitting approval from 
the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) 
within this area. The proposed windfarm was located 
near the boarder of the expedited area and close to 
nine large ponds determined to be “scenic resources 
of state or national significance.” Under the same 
legislation used for permitting, the Board is given the 
power to deny proposals for projects that would 
disrupt or harm scenic resources of the state. The 
Board proceeded to deny Wind Developer’s 
application and proposal. Wind Developer appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Maine, arguing that the 
Board does not have the right to aggregate the 
environmental effect on all nine large ponds, and 
becuase it found no significant effect on any 
individual pond, the project should have been 
approved as drafted. The Supreme Court of Maine 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss5/5
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affirmed the Board’s decision, citing that the law does 
not specifically prohibit such aggregation and that the 
Court may only overturn agency decisions it finds to be 




Teton Co-Op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co., 
2015 WL 8923528, No. DA 15–0136 (Mont. 2015). 
 
Reservoir Company appealed an order of a state water 
court, which adjudicated Canal Company’s water rights 
to the Eureka Reservoir. The issue the court addressed 
on appeal was whether the water court erred in 
determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka 
Reservoir was included as part of Canal Company’s 
notice of appropriation. The Appellate Court reversed 
and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding 
that the water court had misapprehended the effect of 
the evidence that a sizable reservoir at the Eureka site 
was part of a 1890 Notice. As the evidence established, 
the 1890 Notice did not contemplate the Eureka 
Reservoir, and Canal Company failed to prosecute the 
Eureka Reservoir’s development with reasonable 
diligence until the mid-1930s. The Appellate Court held 
that since Canal Company’s claim cannot be staked to 
the 1890 Notice or the nullified 1891 Notice, the water 
court must determine Canal Company’s priority date 




Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647 (Or. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 
State Agencies contended that an 89-mile segment 
study of the Rogue River was declared navigable for 
title purposes in 1975. Due to this declaration of 
navigability, State Agencies further contended that the 
State owned all right, title, and interest in and to the 
lands located below the ordinary high water line along 
the 89-mile river study segment, and it may only be 
used by the public for certain uses. Landowner filed a 
petition for judicial review under the relevant state 
statute challenging State Agencies’ declaration of 
ownership. In assessing State Agencies’ claim 
regarding navigability, the lower court looked to the 
usage of the river. On appeal, State Agencies argued 
that the lower court erred in applying the actual use 
theory rather than the susceptible use theory. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals analyzed whether the upper-
portion of the river was susceptible to navigation in 
1859. After considering several factors, such as log 
drives and recreational use, the Appellate Court 
found that the 89-mile river study segment was not 
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Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 2015 WL 
6646818, No. 14-6198 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 
Property Owners brought a putative class action suit 
against a whiskey distillery operator (Distiller), 
alleging negligence, nuisance, and trespass, based on 
Distiller’s ethanol emissions allegedly combining with 
condensation on Property Owners’ property creating 
fungus. The lower court denied Distiller’s motion to 
dismiss, and Distiller’s filed an interlocutory appeal. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
does not preempt source state common law remedies 
seeking to control air pollution even where the 
defendant is in compliance with CAA requirements. 
Further, even though Distiller’s federally enforceable 
district origin operating permit did not set a cap for 
fugitive ethanol emissions, environmental regulation 
was a field that states had traditionally occupied, and 
allowing states to apply their common law to 
emissions advanced CAA’s stated purposed by 
empowering states to address and curtail air pollution 




Desert Protective Council v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
2015 WL 7292969, No. 13-55561 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 
Council filed suit against the United States 
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land 
Management (collectively, the Government) under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
According to Council, the Government had not given 
Council the ability to read the final bat migration 
studies used in the environmental impact study of a 
proposed wind energy project. The Government had 
published the study for the statutorily required 30 
days, and while Council commented on other sections 
of the environmental impact study, it did not comment 
on the bat migration report. The lower court granted 
summary judgment for the Government. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of 
the Government. In its decision, the Appellate Court 
noted that NEPA does not require environmental 
disturbance mitigation plans to be in their final form 
when published to comply with NEPA procedural 
requirements. The court noted that the Government 
had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its 
publication of the study, nor had it acted so when only 
working to minimize environmental damage, not to 






Rogers v. United States, 2015 WL 6749915, No. 
SC14-1465 (Fla. 2015). 
 
Owners of land abutting railroad parcels (Landowners) 
filed suit against the United States in federal court, 
alleging that the Government effected a taking of their 
property by converting abandoned railroad right-of-
ways to a recreational trail, pursuant to an Act of 
Congress. Landowners appealed from a judgment in 
favor of the Government. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit submitted a certified 
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as to whether 
the railroad company’s interest in the property is 
something less than fee simple absolute by virtue of 
(1) Florida statutes, (2) state policy, and/or (3) the 
factual considerations of this particular case. The 
Supreme Court of Florida answered all three 
components of the certified question in the negative, 
validating the Government’s contention that the 
railroad company could have, by unambiguous deed, 
acquired ownership of the lands in fee simple. The 




White v. Ringgold Telephone Co., 779 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2015). 
 
Telephone Company petitioned to condemn property 
for purposes of providing telephone and 
telecommunication services while Landowner’s 
lawsuit regarding Telephone Company’s alleged 
breach of easement agreement was pending. The lower 
court denied Landowners’ motion to dismiss and 
entered a condemnation order. Landowners appealed 
the condemnation order to the Georgia Court of 
Appeals, which held that Telephone Company 
attempted but was unable to procure the property by 
contract, and condemnation of the property was 
necessary. Therefore, because the trial court sits as the 
finder of fact in ruling on exceptions to a special 
master’s ruling, its judgment will not be disturbed if 








Roberson v. E. W. Chance, 2015 WL 7280562, No. 
50,169–CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 2015). 
 
Landowners brought action against purported Lot 
Owners, alleging that Lot Owners were trespassing 
without the right to possession. The lower court, after 
a bench trial, entered judgment finding that Lot 
Owners obtained the lot by a ten-year acquisitive 
prescription or adverse possession. Landowners then 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held: (1) the first lot 
owner was properly dismissed from the suit; (2) the 
prior owners of the disputed lot, before conveying it to 
Lot Owners, possessed the lot in good faith for at least 
ten years, as required for ten-year acquisitive 
prescription; and (3) the prior owners had just title, as 




DeFelice Corp. v. Department of Public Utilities, 38 
N.E. 3d 1040 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). 
 
Contractor struck an underground natural gas line 
while digging a water main, resulting in an explosion 
with damage to nearby property. The Department of 
Public Utilities (DPU) investigated Contractor’s 
operations, concluding that Contractor failed to take 
the necessary precautionary methods prior to the dig, 
and fined Contractor $31,000 for violating “dig safe” 
laws. Contractor appealed the administrative agency’s 
fine and decision. The Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts determined that it would only overrule 
the discretion of the agency in extraordinary or 





Public Land/Water Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Jones, 358 
P.3d 899 (Mont. 2015). 
 
Landowner prevented access to roads running across 
his property, which served as easements to reach 
adjacent public property. Citizens Group sued for 
declaratory relief and damages. During the 
proceedings, a wildfire destroyed the bridge serving as 
a portion of the easement. Landowner fashioned a new 
bridge using his own railcar, and argued that by 
constructing a new bridge, he was therefore permitted 
to prevent public access to it. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Montana held that Landowner was liable for 
tortious interference of public property and awarded 
Citizens Group damages to pay for a new bridge as 





Van Horn v. Harmony Sand & Gravel, Inc., 442 N.J. 
Super. 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). 
 
In 2014, Landowner, who had inherited land interests 
a decade earlier, filed a complaint to eject Operator 
from the property who had been conducting soil 
excavation on the property. Operator had been 
conducting excavation by a 1990 agreement (First 
Agreement) originally signed by Landowner’s father. 
When the First Agreement expired in 2000, the parties 
executed another agreement (Second Agreement). The 
Second Agreement gave Operator the option to extend 
operations for an indefinite amount of time, expiring 
only when Operator determined there was insufficient 
aggregate material to remove. The parties stipulated 
that no material facts were in dispute and moved for 
summary judgment. The lower court ruled in 
Operator’s favor due to the fact that, although the 
Second Agreement governed no definite period of 
time, the agreement expressly terminated once certain 
conditions were met. On appeal, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey held that the Second Agreement was not a 
lease, despite what the parties called it, because it did 
not give Operator exclusive possession as a leasehold 
estate. Instead, the Second Agreement was a valid 
profit relationship, permitting “severance of the 
physical substances of a servient tenement” without 




Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utilities, Co., 871 N.W.2d 
649 (S.D. 2015). 
 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) issued a permit to 
Power Companies (Companies) that allowed 
Companies to construct a high-voltage electric 
transmission line designed to identify and mitigate 
potential parasite problems. Individual objected and 
appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed PUC’s 
decision to grant the permit. Individual raised two 
questions on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether 
PUC improperly delegated its authority to a private 
party; and (2) whether PUC exceeded a statutory time 
limit for issuing complete findings. The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota affirmed the Appellate Court’s 
decision and held: (1) PUC did not delegate its 
regulatory authority to Companies since the modified 
condition and mitigation plan allowed for PUC to 
verify and exercise its oversight authority over the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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development and construction of the transmission line; 
(2) PUC timely rendered complete findings on the 
permit application since PUC retained future 
enforcement of conditions even without listing 




In re Electric Transmission Texas, LLC, 2015 WL 
6759238, No. 13-15-00423-CV (Tex. App. 2015). 
 
Electricity Transmission Company sought a writ of 
mandamus, contending that the lower court acted 
outside of its jurisdiction in not complying with the 
eminent domain statute when it failed to appoint 
special commissioners and granted a continuance to 
hear Landowner’s Plea in Abatement. The Court of 
Appeals noted that the period between the filing of the 
statement seeking condemnation and the award by the 
special commissioners is “administrative in nature.” 
During this administrative phase, trial court 
jurisdiction “is limited to appointing the 
commissioners, receiving their opinion as to value, 
and rendering judgment based upon the 
commissioners’ award.” In other words, the trial court 
can only act within the prescribed scope of the 
eminent domain statute. Because the trial court acted 
outside of its statutory authority by refusing to appoint 
special commissioners and granting a continuance, 
such orders are void. The Court of Appeals issued a 
writ of mandamus, conditioned on the lower court’s 
failure to vacate its orders and appoint three special 
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